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ABSTRACT
PRODUCT INNOVATION IN DURABLE GOODS
MONOPOLY WITH PARTIAL PHYSICAL
OBSOLESCENCE
Atıl, Aysun
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisors: Assist. Prof. Dr. Kevin Hasker
September 2007
In the literature on planned obsolescence, it has always been assumed that
the durable goods monopolist is able to limit the durability of the whole of
the product. However, usually it is a component of the product rather than
the whole unit that becomes physically obsolete. In this paper, we analyze
R&D incentives of a durable goods monopolist when he is able to engage
in partial physical obsolescence. We showed that under these circumstances
competition in component goods market causes inefficient R&D decisions in
the primary market.
Keywords: Planned Obsolescence, Innovation, Component Goods.
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O¨ZET
KISMI˙ FI˙ZI˙KSEL AS¸INMALI DAYANIKLI MALLAR
TEKELI˙NDE U¨RU¨N YENI˙LI˙G˘I˙
Atıl, Aysun
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Kevin Hasker
Eylu¨l 2007
Planlanmıs¸ amortisman literatu¨ru¨nde, her zaman varsayılmıs¸tır ki dayanıklı
mallar u¨reten tekelci u¨ru¨nu¨n tamamının dayanıklılıg˘ını sınırlandırabilir. An-
cak u¨ru¨nu¨n tamamından ziyade genelde u¨ru¨nu¨n bir parc¸ası fiziksel olarak kul-
lanılmaz hale gelir. Bu tezde, kısmi fiziksel as¸ınma uygulayabilen dayanıklı
mallar u¨reten tekelcinin AR-GE eg˘ilimlerini inceledik. Bu kos¸ullar altında,
parc¸a mallar piyasasındaki rekabetin orijinal u¨ru¨n piyasasında verimsiz AR-
GE kararlarına neden oldug˘unu go¨sterdik.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Planlanmıs¸ amortisman, Yenilik, Parc¸a mallar.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Durability choice and the related issue of planned obsolescence are main
concerns of the analyses in durable goods theory. Planned obsolescence is
defined as the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives
(Bulow, 1986). In the literature on planned obsolescence by a durable-good
monopoly, it has always been assumed that the monopolist is able to limit
the durability of the whole of the product. However, for the most durable
goods such as personal computers, automobiles, cellphones, stereo systems,
it is not the whole unit that becomes completely obsolete, but a component
of a durable good. For example, it is the battery not the cellphone, the toner
fluid not the photocopier, the car parts not the car itself that die first. This
requires analyzing the incentives of a durable good monopolist with regard
to the component durability. Recently, components and component related
service markets gained the attention within the context of pricing decisions
without any possible links to R&D incentives.
In this paper, we study the R&D incentives of a durable good monopolist
when he is able to engage in partial physical obsolescence, which refers to the
obsolescence of components. We use the model in Fishman and Rob (2000)
and adopt it to our setting of planned partial physical obsolescence.
Fishman and Rob (2000) investigate a durable good monopolist’s R&D
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incentive in a model with identical consumers under the assumption that in-
novations are recurrent and knowledge builds up cumulatively. They find
that the monopolist innovates less frequently and invests less than the ef-
ficient level. The reasoning is as follows: When a new model appears, old
models in consumers’ possession are still physically functional. Consumers
are willingly to pay for the incremental flow of services provided by the new
model —until it’s replaced by an upgraded model. However, the introduction
of a new model increments consumers’ utility in perpetuity since the new
model forms the technological base for the subsequent models. This implies
that the monopolist receives less than the social value of an innovation. In
order to compensate this loss, the monopolist waits longer between prod-
uct innovations, thereby lengthening the period which consumers pay for the
services provided by the new model. Fishman and Rob (2000) also suggest
that if the monopolist is able to design each model to last until the new one
is introduce-in other words engage in planned obsolescence, the monopolist
gets the social value of each model and is induced to innovate at the socially
optimal pace.
However, as we state above usually it is a component that becomes phys-
ically obsolete. The competitive environment that these components are pro-
duced become important for a durable good monopolist’s R&D incentives.
With regard to this, we extend Fishman and Rob’s analysis.
We incorporate the component durability by allowing the monopolist to
engage in partial physical obsolescence. The monopolist introduces the new
model as the component of the previous model obsoletes. In that case, the
monopolist is able to charge consumers both for the incremental utility and
the replacement cost of the component. For example, consider a Xerox printer.
The price for one of the models of a Xerox printer is $189, while its component
is sold at a price of $100.55. Moreover, repair costs related to Xerox machines
are quoted at least $50 and there is also an extra cost depending on the
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damage. This implies replacing the component costs as much as buying a
new product. Under these circumstances, we find that if the monopolist
controls the component market, he innovates at the socially optimal pace.
However, if the component market is perfectly competitive, like in Fishman
and Rob (2000) the monopolist innovates less frequently and invests less than
the socially optimal level.
The main concern of this paper is to analyze R&D incentives in the pres-
ence of partial physical obsolescence; nevertheless the insights of this study
also contribute to the aftermarket literature. Aftermarkets are markets for
spare parts, repairs, services and upgrades, etc. The aftermarket good or
service is used together with the original equipment, but is sold after the
purchase of the equipment (Chen, 1998). In this context, components market
can be considered as an aftermarket.
Recently, a number of important court cases in USA, Canada and Europe
has indicated the importance of the aftermarkets. For example, in the Ko-
dak and Xerox cases, the original equipment manufactures were sued for the
attempts to monopolize their aftermarket. One of the questions arising out
of these court cases is that “Does the monopolization of the aftermarket by
the original equipment manufacturers cause an efficiency loss?”.
Borenstein et. al. (2000), point out that many independent service
providers for high technology products have sued equipment manufacturers
for allegedly excluding them from providing maintenance services. They show
that price in the services and parts market (aftermarket) will exceed marginal
cost despite the competition in the equipment market. Chen and Ross (1998)
observe that both in USA and Europe a number of anti-trust cases have
involved allegations that manufacturers of durable goods have refused to sup-
ply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the
market for repairs of their products. They study such refusals in a competitive
market and its connected aftermarket and find that refusals help to support
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higher prices for high value users but at the same time permit the recovery
of higher costs incurred during an initial warranty period. Since full prices
reflect full marginal costs at equilibrium, the refusals permit the attainment
of a first-best outcome. Accordingly, an attempt by anti-trust authorities to
force supply would be welfare reducing. Similarly in terms of R&D decisions,
we find that if the component good market becomes more competitive, the
R&D investments depart more from its socially optimal level. Hence, the
monopolization of the components market is welfare inducing.
The distinct feature of our model is the presence of partial physical
obsolescence- namely a component becomes obsolete. We analyze the ef-
fects of the market structure in the components market on R&D decisions of
a durable good monopolist and find that if the monopolist engages in partial
physical obsolescence, then the competition in the component market causes
innovations to depart from socially optimal level. When there is perfect com-
petition in the component market, our analysis of monopoly equilibrium is
same as Fishman&Rob’s (2000) analysis of monopoly equilibrium without
obsolescence. We should note that although much of our discussion concerns
durable goods monopolists, this does not mean that the insights from our
analysis only apply to such settings. Even though most durable goods pro-
ducers are not monopolists, most do have market power so that monopoly
analysis should provide useful insights.
In the next chapter, we present relevant literature in planned obsolescence.
In Chapter 3, we set up the basic framework of our model and in Chapter 4,
we analyze the social optimum. Chapter 5 contains the analysis of monopoly
equilibrium when the monopolist controls the component market. Chapter
6 and 7 contain respectively analyses of monopoly equilibrium, first with
perfect competitive component market and second with imperfect competitive
component market. In Chapter 8, we present our results.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Recently two issues have generated controversy in durable goods litera-
ture: (i) Do firms have an incentive to reduce durability below socially opti-
mal level? (ii) To what extent do firms have an incentive to introduce new
products that make old units obsolete? The main concern of these issues is
actually to explore whether firms engage in ”planned obsolescence” or not.
Analyses related to the planned obsolescence in durable goods theory can
be grouped in two categories. First group, which includes Coase (1972),
Bulow (1986) and Swan (1972) accept the definition that planned obsolescence
is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives. Second
group leading by Waldman (1993; 1996), Choi (1994) and Kumar (2002)
suggest that planned obsolescence is about how often a firm will introduce
new products that make old units obsolete. Therefore, the first approach to
planned obsolescence can be considered in terms of durability choice whereas
the second approach to planned obsolescence can be considered in terms of
R&Ddecisions. Within this context, several authors analyze the incentives of
a durable goods monopolist who sells its products.
Coase (1972) considers the dynamic pricing problem of a monopoly selling
a durable good to consumers with different valuations. He suggests that
durable goods monopolist faces a time inconsistency problem. The problem
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arises since durable goods sold in the future affect the value of units sold
today. In the absence of ability to commit to future prices, the monopolist
does not internalize this effect. Coase argues that under these circumstances
the price must eventually fall as the market clears high-valuation consumers.
In Coase’s analysis, planned obsolescence restores the monopoly’s ability to
charge monopoly prices.
Following Coase’s conjecture (Coase, 1972), Bulow (1982; 1986), considers
a durable good monopolist who sells output in each of two periods. If the
monopolist is unable to commit to future production levels, in the second
period he will choose the production level which maximizes its second period
profits. However, additional units in the second period reduces the second
period value of the units previously sold. Rational consumers who anticipate
this reduction are not willing to pay higher prices in the first period and as a
result overall monopoly profits fall. Bulow argues that by reducing durability
of its output, the durable goods monopolist can solve its time inconsistency
problem.
Swan (1972) handles the issue of planned obsolescence in terms of durabil-
ity choice incorporating secondhand markets to the analysis. In the context
of automobile market, he examines the optimal durability choice of a durable
goods monopolist when new and used cars are perfect substitutes. Given a
flexible production policy, the monopolist would like the minimize the cost of
any given service flow from a stock of durable goods. Consumers are willing
to pay higher prices for new goods if they also receive higher prices for their
trade-ins. Swan argues that given the inelastic demand for used cars limiting
durabilty enables the monopolist to reduce the flow of services provided by
used cars, thereby increasing used car prices. However, a monopolist cen re-
strict the supply of future used cars by varying the price of new goods rather
than varying the durability level. Swan shows that for the durable goods
monopolist there is no distortion in terms of durability.
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Related to Swan’s analysis (Swan, 1972), Rust (1986) also considers the
optimal durability choice of a durable goods monopolist when there is a sec-
ondary market for used durable goods. He suggests that secondary market
provides close substitutes for new durable goods limiting profits of the monop-
olist in the primary market. By limiting product durability, the monopolist
ensures that used goods are worse substitutes for new goods. Contrary to
Swan, Rust also argues that it is not the existence of secondary markets,
but the endogenous scrappage of durables which provides consumers with
a substitution possibility that constraints monopoly profits. He considers a
Stackelberg game between the monopolist and consumers and shows that for
some specific values of parameters the selling monopolist prefers to kill off
the secondary market by reducing durability.
Samuelson and Bond (1987) analyze the effects of durability on the incen-
tives to innovate. They argue that since future price of a durable good affects
the current demand for that good, durability creates incentives to innovate.
They consider a monopoly that sells a durable good in two periods, with the
cost of production in each period depending on investments in R&D. Since
some costs of increasing output is not internal to the firm, the monopolist
can increase its output in order to exploit the residual demand he faces in the
second period. Expanding output increases the marginal profitabilty of inno-
vation. However, the standard incentive of the monopolist to reduce output
below its socially optimal level has a diverse effect on innovation. Therefore,
depending on which one of these conflicting effects dominates, the selling
monopolist invests less or more on innovation than is socially optimal.
The common approach accepted in planned obsolescence (in terms of dura-
bility choice) literature is that the monopolist is able to limit the durability of
whole of the product. Within this context, the economic motives for and wel-
fare consequences of limiting product durability in durable goods monopoly
are analyzed. However, usually a component of a product rather than the
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whole good becomes obsolete. In this paper, different than the previous lit-
erature, we handle the issue of planned obsolescence in terms of component
durability, which we refer as ”partial physical obsolescence”.
Waldman (1993; 1996), Choi (1994), and Kumar (2002) have also consid-
ered that the introduction of a new product can lower the value of used units.
Waldman (1996) demonstrates that a similar result to that in Coase (1972)
and Bulow (1986) holds within the context of the monopolist’s R&D expendi-
tures. Since the monopolist does not internalize in the second period how its
behavior affects the value of units sold previously, the monopolist’s incentive
to invest in R&D that makes past production ”technologically obsolete” is
too high. Hence in that paper the term planned obsolescence is used to mean
that the monopolist has an incentive to engage in R&D decisions and new
products introductions and thereby make the past production technologically
obsolete. Waldman finds that although time inconsistency causes overinvest-
ment in R&D from the standpoint of the monopolist’s own profitability, from
the standpoint of social welfare the time inconsistency problem is in fact ben-
eficial. He finds that in the case where the monopolist can commit to a future
value for R&D, the firm is unable to capture all the societal benefits from the
improved quality of its output. As a result the private incentive to invest in
R&D is less than the incentive that is social welfare maximizing.
Like Waldman (1996), Choi (1994) examines the economic incentives for
inducing incompatibilities between generations of products and explores the
welfare consequences of the product differentiations. He considers a durable
goods monopolist who offers products in each of two periods and determines
to introduce a compatible or an incompatible product in the second period.
He argues that if the monopolist is able to price discriminate between old
and new customers, the monopolist prefers to sell an incompatible product to
both type of consumers whereas social efficieny requires to sell a compatible
product only to newcomers. If the monopolist is not able to price discriminate,
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the society suffers an extreme underconsumption in the first period. In that
case, the monopolist does not offer any product in the first period and social
ineffienciency arises due to no product availability.
Kumar (2002) analyzes the effects of resale trading on the price and qual-
ity decisions of a durable goods monopolist. He considers a durable goods
monopolist who varies price and quality of an infinitely durable product over
time in a market of heterogenous, but rational consumers. He suggests that
time inconsistency problem arises due to intertemporal quality discrimination.
The reason is that quality upgrades may induce high-valuation consumers to
delay purchase, which leads a constraint on monopoly prices. However, by re-
sale trading the monopolist can price discriminate between high-valuation and
low-valuation consumers, thereby overcomes its time inconsistency problem.
Kumar observes that the monopolist’s optimal price and quality offers in new
goods market may have complex dynamic patterns. He shows that because
of future resale trading, the monopolist may introduce a product of ineffi-
cient quality. However, initial quality distortions are followed by steady-state
quality allocations that are always efficient for high-valuation consumers.
Both Waldman (1996) and Choi (1994) have considered planned obsoles-
cence as how often a firm will introduce a new product and how compatible
the new product will be with older products. In both analyses, costs of inno-
vation incurred by firms are ignored. We incorporate investment expenditures
on R&D into the analysis.
Fishman and Rob ’s study (2000) explained in Chapter 1 is the bench-
mark analysis we adopt our model. In the setting of Fishman and Rob,
product durability limits market power by increasing the value of the con-
sumers’ outside option and thereby reducing their willingness to pay for new
models. Hence limiting product durability reduces the value of consumers’
outside options. However, we should note that while the ability to precommit
to future sales completely resolves the Coasian monopoly’s problem a similar
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ability to precommit to future introduction dates does not accomplish the
same purpose in the context of recurring innovations. It is also important to
note that in the Coasian setting (Coase, 1972), market efficiency is improved
as prices fall, but in Fishman and Rob a monopolist that can not charge
for the social value of an innovation innovates less than the socially efficient
amount.
We analyze R&D incentives of a durable goods monopolist when a com-
ponent that is complementary to the original product obsoletes. Therefore,
the structure of the component market becomes crucial in the analysis of in-
novation activity in the primary market in which original goods are sold. If
we consider components market as an aftermarket, the insights of our study
also contribute to the aftermarket literature.
Chen et al. (1998) analyze the court cases such as Kodak, Chrysler and
Xerox in which original equipment manufacturers are accused of refusing sup-
ply parts to independent service organizations. Chen et al. state that these
refusals by original equipment manufacturers involve attempts to monopolize
their aftermarkets. Furthermore, they provide a summary of the economic
theories of aftermarkets which try to explain the motives of aftermarket mo-
nopolization. One of the aftermarket theories cited in Chen et al. (1998) is
”Consumer Surprise Theory”, which suggests that switching costs may pre-
vent a customer from switching to a different brand even if the prices of the
aftermarket products and services raised substantially. In this way, origi-
nal equipment manufacturers earn abnormal profits by their installed base of
customers. However, this theory is criticized since it does not involve ”repu-
tation effects”, which implies higher aftermarket prices induce potential new
consumers to purchase other brands.
Boreinstein et al. (2000) analyze firms’ two goals- exploiting lock-in cus-
tomers by raising aftermarket prices and limiting its aftermarket prices due to
reputation effects, in a differentiated duopoly model. They examine whether
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competition in durable goods market prevents manufacturers from exercis-
ing market power over aftermarket products and services. They show that
regardless of the structure of the equipment market, the price in the aftermar-
ket exceeds marginal cost of production. In their model, original equipment
manufacturers monopolize their associated aftermarket goods and firms are
not able to commit to future prices. There is a crucial restriction on demand
side that consumers are always prefer using old units by acquiring services to
purchasing new goods. Boreinstein et al. show that if the option to scrap and
buy new good is binding at the margin, the aftermarket price is increasing
in the degree of firm’s market power in the equipment market. This analysis
does not include the connection between intensity of use and switching costs.
Chen and Ross suggest that aftermarket prices can be used to discriminate
between high intensity- high value users and low intensity- low value users.
They state that higher aftermarket prices are needed to recover the costs of
warranty protection. The reason is that more frequent servicing is required
for high intensity consumers in the post warranty period and if the manufac-
turer can not identify higher intensity customes before purchase, it can not
imbed higher expected costs into their original equipment price. In a compet-
itive market and connected aftermarket where firms are able to commit future
prices, by charging a low price for the primary product, providing a warranty
for the first period and then supracompetitive price for repairs in the second
period, each firm is able to set an expected full price for each customer equal
to marginal costs of serving that customer. Hence, forcing original equipment
manufacturers to supply parts to independent service organizations is welfare
reducing. Chen and Ross’s analysis is an example to ”The Price Discrimi-
nation Theory” cited in Chen et. all, which suggests that aftermarket prices
as a metering device to discriminate between high intensity- high value users
and low intensity- low value users.
Marinoso also analyzes endogenous switching costs that reduce competi-
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tion in aftermarkets. He suggests that in order to monopolize their aftermar-
ket, firms may use technological incompatibility which creates endogenous
switching costs. In a two period duopoly model, firms introduce a system
which consists of various components in the first period whereas in the second
period they introduce both the system and the complement that is broken.
Endogenous switching costs are driven by second period equilibrium prices
of complements and durables. Marinoso states that if firms are able to price
discriminate between old consumers and newcomers, switching costs do not
affect rational consumers’ initial purchasing decisions. Hence, there is no
connection between aftermarket prices and initial equipment sales. In these
circumstances, introduction of compatible technology in the second period de-
pends on the costs incurred by firms to achieve compatibility. Marinoso shows
that with homogeneous products and small costs of reaching compatibility,
endogenous switching costs induce firms to prefer compatible products.
The studies mentioned above and other aftermarket theories generally fo-
cus on the incentives of original equipment manufacturers to raise aftermarket
prices and its welfare consequences. There has been little research concerning
efficiency losses in terms of R&D decisions due to the structure of the com-
ponent market. Within this context, our study presents a different approach
to the aftermarket literature.
Fishman and Rob (2000) is related to the Coase Conjecture (Coase, 1972)
in the sense that planned obsolescence is a business strategy that help a
durable good monopolist to maintain its market power. Coase (1972) con-
sidered the dynamic pricing problem of a monopoly selling a durable good
(of fixed quality) to consumers with different valuations (Bulow, 1982; 1986).
Coase argued that if the monopoly is unable to commit to future prices (or
equivalently, commit not to sell any more units), the price must eventually
fall as the market clears of high valuation buyers in the second period. In
that setting, planned obsolescence restores the monopoly’s ability to charge
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monopoly prices. In the setting of Fishman and Rob (2000), product dura-
bility limits market power by increasing the value of the consumers’ outside
option and thereby reducing their willingness to pay for new models. Hence
limiting product durability reduces the value of consumers’ outside options.
However, we should note that while the ability to precommit to future sales
completely resolves the Coasian monopoly’s problem a similar ability to pre-
commit to future introduction dates does not accomplish the same purpose
in the context of recurring innovations. It is also important to note that in
the Coasian setting, market efficiency is improved as prices fall, but in Fish-
man and Rob a monopolist that can not charge for the social value of an
innovation innovates less than the socially efficient amount.
Waldman (1993; 1996), Choi (1994), Kumar (2002) have also considered
that the introduction of a new product can lower the value of used units.
Waldman (1996) demonstrates that a similar result to that in Coase (1972)
and Bulow (1972) holds within the context of the monopolist’s R&D expendi-
tures. Since the monopolist does not internalize in the second period how its
behavior affects the value of units sold previously, the monopolist’s incentive
to invest in R&D that makes past production “technologically obsolete” is
too high. Hence in that paper the term planned obsolescence is used to mean
that the monopolist has an incentive to engage in R&D decisions and new
products introductions and thereby make the past production technologically
obsolete. Waldman finds that although time inconsistency causes overinvest-
ment in R&D from the standpoint of the monopolist’s own profitability, from
the standpoint of social welfare the time inconsistency problem is in fact ben-
eficial. He finds that in the case where the monopolist can commit to a future
value for R&D, the firm is unable to capture all the societal benefits from the
improved quality of its output. As a result the private incentive to invest in
R&D is less than the incentive that is social welfare maximizing.
13
CHAPTER 3
THE MODEL
We consider a monopolist that introduces infinitely durable products peri-
odically. Every period starts with an introduction of a new model and at the
beginning of each period, the monopolist decides on its R&D investment. The
quality level of the current product is q ∈R+. As Fishman and Rob (2000)
state, introduction of a new model is preceded by an R&D stage, called a
“gestation period”. The monopolist has to decide the length of the gestation
period, which is denoted by t and the per period R&D expenditures in it,
which is denoted by x. Quality increment between two consecutive products
is determined by g, which is a function of x and t. Then the quality of the
new model is q + g (x, t).
Like in Fishman and Rob (2000), we allow recurrent introductions and
assume that quality improvements are cumulative1. When the monopolist
introduces a new product, it incurs in addition to R&D expenditures a fixed
cost of F , which is a lump-sum payment. F can be considered an implemen-
tation cost, the amount the monopolist must pay for augmenting the present
product. There is a constant marginal cost of production, c. We assume for
simplicity the production cost is invariant to the quality of the product. We
1Fishman and Rob define recurrent introductions such that the introduction of one
model triggers the development of the next one. They also assume quality improvements are
cumulative: If two models are introduced in sequence, and if their R&D inputs are (x1, t1)
and (x2, t2) , then the quality of the second-generation model is q + g (x1, t1) + g (x2, t2)
and similarly for later generations.
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impose the following assumption to ensure that innovation is not too costly
relative to the benefit:
Assumption 1 g is strictly concave, bounded, increasing in x and t, twice
continuously differentiable, g (x, 0) = g (0, t) = 0, and there exists an
{xp, tp} so that r (F + c) < δg (xp, tp)− (ertp − 1)xp where δ ∈ (0, 1] .
r denotes the positive discount rate, which is common for consumers and
firms. We have the first five restrictions on g in order to simplify the analysis.
The last restriction guarantees that the monopolist always invests in R&D
and introduces new models (t <∞, x > 0).
Different than Fishman and Rob (2000), we have the additional assump-
tion for g in order to achieve concavity around the optimal solution, thereby
obtaining differentiability of the objective function.
Assumption 2 For λ ∈ (0, 1] ,
λ2gxxgtt ≥
(
λgxt − rert
)2
It is just a stronger concavity condition than what is stated in Assumption
3.
There is a finitely durable component good that complements the primary
product. The life of the component coincides with the gestation period. As
the new generation of the primary product is introduced, the component
that is complementary to the current product obsoletes. We assume the
component good is produced at a cost of αc, where α ∈ (0, 1) . Thus, the
production cost of the component is just a constant fraction of the marginal
cost of the primary product.
On the demand side, there is a continuum of identical infinitely lived con-
sumers of measure 1. Each consumer may consume at most one durable good.
A representative consumer derives a flow utility of $q from product of quality,
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q. When the new generation is introduced, consumers must decide whether
to purchase a new model or to replace the component of the current product.
If the component is replaced, then the flow utility is the same as if they had
bought a new good of the same generation. The price of the component,
which is denoted by pc, is crucial for the monopolist’s R&D decisions since pc
affects the opportunity cost of buying a new model. We assume pc depends
on g, q, αc. We have the following restrictions on pc (g, q, αc):
Assumption 3 pc (g, q, αc) is concave, bounded, increasing in q and twice
continuously differentiable. Moreover, pc ∈ {αc, q} .
The first four assumptions are fairly standard. The last assumption en-
sures that the price of the component can not exceed the flow utility of the
primary product that the component is complementary to and also it can not
be below its production cost.
Throughout our analysis the monopolist sells its products rather than rent
them and there is no secondhand market for the primary product.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SOCIAL OPTIMUM
We first derive the socially optimal outcome for the innovation activity in
order to detect whether the monopolist’ R&D decisions are efficient or not.
Given the initial quality, q0, the social planner chooses R&D expenditures,
{x1, x2, x3, ...} and gestation periods, {t1, t2, t3, ...}. We can denote the cal-
endar dates at which new models are introduced as Ti, where ∀i, T i =
i∑
j=1
tj.
The quality of the model introduced at Ti is
i∑
j=1
g (xj, tj) and the social plan-
ner delivers benefits from this model over [Ti, Ti+1). Thus, as of date Ti, it
generates a discounted benefit of
(
i∑
j=1
g (xj, tj)
)(
(1−e−rti+1)
r
)
. Hence, the
sequential problem for the social planner can be written as follows:
(SP ) sup
{xi,ti}∞i=1
W (q0, x, t) s.t.
W (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+ (−x1) 1− e
−rt1
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi
[
− (F + c) +
[
i∑
j=1
g (xj, tj)− xi+1
]
1− e−rti+1
r
]
(4.1)
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or
W (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1
[
−xi (1− e
−rti)
r
+ e−rti
(
g (xi, ti)
r
− (F + c)
)]
(4.2)
LetW be the social welfare function. Our first result states that the social
welfare function in equation 4.2 is bounded.
Lemma 1 For any given path {xi, ti}∞i=1, W (q0, x, t) < ∞. Furthermore, if
{xi, ti}∞i=1 is an optimal path, then q0r < W (q0, x, t) and ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞.
Proof Suppose that for a given path {xi, ti}, W (q0, x, t) =∞.
In equation 4.2, W is infinite only if for infinitely many periods e−rTi−1
is nearly 1. Since e−rTi−1 = e−r(Ti−2+ti−1), that is equivalent to e−rTI−1 → 1 as
I → ∞. TI−1 → 0 iff ∀i ∈ N, ti → 0. This implies ∀i ∈ N, g (xi, ti) → 0.
Hence, we get
lim
TI−1→0
I−1∑
i=1
e−rTI−1
[
−xi (1− e
−rti)
r
+ e−rti
(
g (xi, ti)
r
− (F + c)
)]
→ − (I − 1) (F + c)
As I →∞, W (q0, x, t)→ −∞. However, we assumed that W (q0, x, t) =
∞. Thus we have a contradiction.
Now, suppose that {x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ) . LetWp be the value of the constant
stream, where ∀i ∈ N, {xi, ti} = {xp, tp}. Hence,
Wp (q0, xp, tp) =
q0 − xp
r
+
e−rtp
1− e−rtp
(
− (F + c) + g (xp, tp)
r
)
(4.3)
If we substitute r (F + c) < g (xp, tp)− (ertp − 1)xp into equation 4.3, we
get Wp (q0, xp, tp) >
q0
r
.
Since {x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ), the value generated by the stream {x∗i , t∗i } must
be at least equal to any other stream. This implies that W ∗ (q0, x∗, t∗) ≥ Wp >
q0
r
.
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Finally we need to show that ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞. Suppose that there exists an
optimal path {xi, ti} such that for some period k, tk = ∞. The value of the
stream after the introduction of the product of quality qk−1,
W (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1− e
−rtk
r
+
∞∑
i=k
e−rTi
[
− (F + c) +
[
i∑
j=1
g (xj, tj)− xi+1
]
1− e−rti+1
r
]
Second line in the above expression is zero since ∀i ≥ k, e−rTi → 0 as
tk →∞. Hence,
W (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1
r
≤ qk−1
r
However, we proved that W (qk−1, x, t) >
qk−1
r
. Thus, ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞. 
We are now going to show that non-degenerate R&D only occurs if the
next generation will be introduced. Otherwise, there is no innovation.
Lemma 2 If there exists a solution to (SP ) in equation 4.2, then ∀i ∈ N,
ti <∞ =⇒ xi > 0 for the optimal path.
Proof Suppose that there exists an optimal path {xi, ti} s.t. ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞,
but ∃ s ∈ N s.t. xs = 0. The value generated by this stream after the
introduction of the product at generation s− 1 :
W (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + 1− e
−rts
r
s−1∑
j=1
g (xj, tj) + e
−rtsW (qs, x, t)
Take an another stream s.t. ∀i/s ∈ N, x′i = xi, t′i = ti and for period s,
x′s = 0, t
′
s = 0. The value of this path at time s− 1 :
W
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
= − (F + c) + 1− e
−rt′s
r
s−1∑
j=1
g
(
x′j, t
′
j
)
+ e−rt
′
sW ′ (q′s, x
′, t′)
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Since t′s = 0,
1− e−rt′s
r
s−1∑
j=1
g
(
x′j, t
′
j
)
= 0.
Note that qs−1 =
s−1∑
i=1
g (xi, ti) =
s−1∑
i=1
g (x′i, t
′
i) = q
′
s−1. Also we know that
g (xs, ts) = 0 when xs = 0. That is q
′
s = qs, which implies W (qs, x, t) =
W ′ (q′s, x
′, t′) . Since {xi, ti} is optimal, W (qs−1, x, t) ≥ W ′
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
. Thus,
1− e−rts
r
s−1∑
j=1
g (xj, tj) +
(
e−rts − 1)W (qs, x, t) ≥ 0 (4.4)
It is satisfied when either ts = 0 or W (qs, x, t) ≤ qsr .
However, by Lemma 1 above, W (qs, x, t) >
qs
r
. Hence, ts = 0 and
W (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + e−rtsW (qs, x, t)
< W (qs, x, t)
However, when g (xs, ts) = 0, W (qs−1, x, t) = W (qs, x, t) . Thus, we have a
contradiction. So, if {xi, ti} is an optimal path and ∀i ∈ N, ti < ∞, then
∀i ∈ N, xi > 0. 
Our next result shows that the social welfare function, W attains a global
maximum.
Proposition 1 There exists a global maximum to the planner’s problem.
Proof The objective function for the social planner is
W (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1
[
−xi (1− e
−rti)
r
+ e−rti
(
g (xi, ti)
r
− (F + c)
)]
Note that ∀i ∈ N, g (xi, ti) is bounded. So, for some j ∈ N, W (q0, x, t)→
−∞ as xj → ∞. That is for some X, W (q0, x, t) < 0, ∀xi > X. How-
ever, we established in Lemma 1 that W (q0, x, t) >
q0
r
. Hence, xi’s must
be chosen from [0, X]. Also, for some j ∈ N, as tj → ∞, W (q0, x, t) <
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W (q0, x, t) + W (qj−1, xp, tp) = W ′ where W (qj−1, xp, tp) is the profit gen-
erated by a constant stream {xp, tp} after the introduction of the product
of quality qj−1. We proved before W (qj−1, xp, tp) >
qj−1
r
. This implies for
some T, W (q0, x, t) < W
′, ∀ti > T. So, ti’s must be chosen from [0, T ] . The
maximum must be within the compact domain [0, X]× [0, T ] .
Since g is continuous, W is continuous. W is continuous within the com-
pact domain [0, X]× [0, T ]. So, it has a maximum. By the Lemma 2, we have
an interior solution. 
We have showed that there exists a solution to the planner’s problem. Let
W ∗ denote a solution to (SP ) in equation 4.1. However, we want to proceed
our analysis with dynamic programming methods. In order to do that, we
have to establish the functional equation for the social planner’s problem.
Let q denote the quality of the current product and V (q) denote the value
function of the social planner after the introduction of the current product.
Then, we can write the following Bellman equation:
(FE) V (q) = max
x,t
{
(q − x) 1− e
−rt
r
− e−rt (F + c) + e−rtV (q + g (x, t))
}
(4.5)
Hereafter, we refer equation 4.5 as the functional equation for the social
planner’s problem. In the following lemma, we will prove that the solutions
to (SP ) in equation 4.1 coincide with the solutions to (FE) in equation 4.5.
Lemma 3 W ∗ solves (FE).
Proof Let Q be the set of possible values for the state variable, in case the
quality of the current product, q. > : Q → Q denotes the correspondence
such that for each q ∈ Q, > (q) is the set of the feasible values for the quality
of the product next period. Let A = {(qi, qi+1) ∈ Q×Q : qi+1 ∈ > (qi)} be
the graph of >, and H : A → R be the per period return function. The
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objective function in equation 4.2 can also be written as follows:
W (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
βiHi where (4.6)
βi = e
−rTi−1 and
Hi = −xi (1− e
−rti)
r
+ e−rti
(
g (xi, ti)
r
− (F + c)
)
Since > (qi) = qi + g (xi+1, ti+1) = qi+1 for each i ∈ N, Q is a convex subset
of R , and the correspondence > : Q→ Q is nonempty, compact-valued and
continuous. For each i ∈ N, 0 < ti < ∞, which implies 0 < βi < 1. Note
also that g is bounded and continuous, and ∀i ∈ N, (xi, ti) ∈ [0, X] × [0, T ].
Hence, Hi is bounded and continuous for each i ∈ N. With conditions above
satisfied, solutions to (FE) coincide exactly to solutions of (SP ) (Stokey,
1989). 
Now, we point out an interesting fact about the derivative of this value
function with respect to q.
Lemma 4 V is continuously differentiable at q. Moreover, if Vq (q) < ∞,
then at the optimal solution Vq (q) =
1
r
.
Proof First, we will show the differentiability of V. By Assumption 3, H
is strictly concave(see the appendix). g is continuously differentiable, so is
H. Also, by construction, > is convex. With these conditions satisfied, V is
continuously differentiable at q (Stokey, 1989).
Now, assume that Vq (q) < ∞. Since Vq (q) = 1−e−rtr + e−rtVq(q + g), Vq
is increasing in Vq(q + g). Let G be the greatest lower bound and U be the
least upper bound for Vq. Then,
G ≤ 1− e
−rt
r
+ e−rtVq(q + g). (4.7)
Since the right hand side of equation 4.7 is increasing in Vq(q+ g), it achieves
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its minimum when Vq(q + g) = G. Thus,
G =
1− e−rt
r
+ e−rtG
or G = 1
r
. Likewise, U = 1
r
. Since the least upper bound and the greatest
lower bound are equal, G ≤ Vq (q) ≤ U implies Vq (q) = 1r . 
V satisfies the following first order conditions:
−(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rtVq (q) gx = 0 (4.8)
e−rt ((q − x) + r (F + c)− rV (q + g) + Vq (q) gt) = 0 (4.9)
Substituting Vq (q) =
1
r
,
−(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
1
r
gx = 0 (4.10)
(q − x) + r (F + c)− rV (q + g) + 1
r
gt = 0 (4.11)
These first order conditions will be useful when we analyze the market
equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 5
THE EQUILIBRIUM WHEN THE
MONOPOLIST CONTROLS THE
COMPONENT MARKET
In this chapter, we will analyze the market equilibrium, where all generations
are introduced by an infinitely lived monopolist and the monopolist also con-
trols the component market. We find that this leads to the socially optimal
amount of investment and gestation periods.
When consumers decide whether to buy the newly introduced product or
not, they will compare the quality increment they observe in the new product
versus the price of the component good. Thus, when the monopolist sells its
primary product, the price it charges is affected by the following factors:
-the quality of the product consumers have in their possession,
-the quality of the new product,
-consumers’ expectations regarding the length of time the new generation
would be on the technological frontier before a superior product is introduced
-the price of the component.
Consumers with a quality q good in their possession will buy a quality q′
good at a price of p if
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q′
1− e−rte
r
− p ≥ (q − pc) 1− e
−rte
r
q′
1− e−rte
r
− p ≥ 0
where pc is the price of the component good
1 and te is the consumers’ expec-
tation about how long they are going to use the new generation. Thus the
price of the primary product, p must satisfy
p ≤ 1− e
−rte
r
min {q′, (q′ − q) + pc}
Therefore, pc = q is the optimal price for the component and p =
1−e−rte
r
q′
is the optimal price for the primary product. If consumers are using several
different generations of the good, then pc is the maximum of the various qual-
ity levels. In a rational-expectations equilibrium the consumers’ expectations
are fulfilled, which implies te at the ith introduction equals ti+1 for all i ∈ N.
Hence, the sequential problem for the monopolist can be written as follows:
(SP ) sup
{xi,ti}∞i=1
pi (q0, x, t)
where
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+ (−x1) 1− e
−rt1
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, q, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
(5.1)
In the following lemma, we will show that the objective function in equa-
tion 5.1 is bounded.
1for simplicity it is in flow terms
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Lemma 5 For any given path {xi, ti}∞i=1, pi (q0, x, t) < ∞. Furthermore, if
{xi, ti}∞i=1 is an optimal path, then q0r < pi (q0, x, t) and ∀i ∈ N , ti <∞.
Proof We can rewrite the objective function in equation 5.1 as follows:
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1e−rti [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, q, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1
[
−e−rti (F + c)− xi1− e
−rti
r
]
(5.2)
Now suppose that pi (q0, x, t) =∞. Under Assumption 3 and Assumption
3, pi is infinite only if for infinitely many periods e−rTi−1 is nearly 1. This
implies e−rTI−1 → 1 as I → ∞. TI−1 → 0 iff ∀i ∈N, ti → 0. This implies
∀i ∈N, g (xi, ti) → 0. We look for rational expectations equilibrium. So,
∀i ∈N, tei → 0. This yields
lim
TI−1→0
I−1∑
i=1
e−rTI−1e−rti [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, q, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+ lim
TI−1→0
I−1∑
i=1
e−rTI−1
[
−e−rti (F + c)− xi1− e
−rti
r
]
→ − (I − 1) (F + c)
As I → ∞, pi (q0, x, t) → −∞. However, we assumed that pi (q0, x, t) = ∞.
Thus we have a contradiction.
Now, suppose that {x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ) . Let pip be the value of the constant
stream, where ∀i ∈N, {xi, ti} = {xp, tp}. Hence,
pip =
q0 − xp
r
+
g (xp, tp)
(
1− e−rte)
r (ertp − 1) +
∞∑
i=1
e−ritp
(
1− e−rte) pc (g, qi, αc)
r
−(F + c)
ertp − 1
(5.3)
Since the monopolist controls the component market, for each i ∈ N,
pc (g, qi, αc) = qi−1 > 0. If we take δ =
(
1− e−rte) in Assumption 3, we
have pip (q0, xp, tp) >
q0
r
.
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{x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ), thereby implying pi∗ (q0, x∗, t∗) ≥ pip > q0r .
In order to prove that ∀i ∈ N, ti < ∞, suppose there exists an optimal
path {xi, ti} such that for some period k, tk = ∞. The value of the stream
after the introduction of the product of quality qk−1,
pi (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1− e
−rtk
r
+
∞∑
i=k
e−rTi [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, q, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=k
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
Again, second line in the above expression is zero since ∀i ≥ k, e−rTi → 0
as tk →∞. Hence,
pi (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1
r
.
≤ qk−1
r
.
However, we find that pi (qk−1, x, t) >
qk−1
r
. This leads to a contradiction.
Thus, ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞. 
We are now going to show that the monopolist invests in R&D in every
gestation period.
Lemma 6 If there exists a solution to (SP ) , then ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞ =⇒ xi > 0
for the optimal path.
Proof Suppose that there exists an optimal path {xi, ti} s.t. ∀i ∈ N, ti <
∞, but ∃ s ∈ N s.t. xs = 0. The value generated by this stream after the
introduction of the product at generation s− 1 :
pi (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + 1− e
−rts
r
[g (xs−1, ts−1) + pc (g, q, αc)]
+e−rtspi (qs, x, t)
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Take an another stream s.t. ∀i/s ∈ N, x′i = xi, t′i = ti and for period s,
x′s = 0, t
′
s = 0. The value of this path at time s− 1 :
pi
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
= − (F + c) + 1− e
−rt′s
r
[
g
(
x′s−1, t
′
s−1
)
+ pc (g, q
′, αc)
]
+e−rt
′
spi (q′s, x
′, t′)
Note that we substitute tes−1 = ts in above equations. Since t
′
s = 0,
1− e−rt′s
r
[
g
(
x′s−1, t
′
s−1
)
+ pc (g, q
′, αc)
]
= 0.
Again we have qs−1 =
s−1∑
i=1
g (xi, ti) =
s−1∑
i=1
g (x′i, t
′
i) = q
′
s−1. We know that
g (xs, ts) = 0 when xs = 0. That is q
′
s = qs, which implies pi (qs, x, t) =
pi (q′s, x
′, t′) . Also, at time s − 1, pc (g, q, αc) = qs−1 = pc (g, q′, αc). By opti-
mality, pi (qs−1, x, t) ≥ pi
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
. It is satisfied when
1− e−rts
r
[g (xs−1, ts−1) + pc (g, q, αc)] +
(
e−rts − 1) pi (qs, x, t) ≥ 0
That is either
ts = 0
or
pi (qs, x, t) ≤ g (xs−1, ts−1) + pc (g, q, αc)
r
. (5.4)
Remember that at time s − 1, pc (g, q, αc) = qs−2. Substituting qs = qs−1 in
equation 5.4 yields
pi (qs, x, t) ≤ qs
r
(5.5)
However, by Lemma 5 above, pi (qs, x, t) >
qs
r
. Thus, ts = 0 and
pi (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + e−rtspi (qs, x, t)
< pi (qs, x, t)
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However, g (xs, ts) = 0 implies pi (qs−1, x, t) = pi (qs, x, t) . Thus we have a
contradiction. Hence, if {xi, ti} is an optimal path and ∀i ∈ N, ti < ∞, then
∀i ∈ N, xi > 0. 
The following proposition states that there is a solution to monopolist’s
problem in equation 5.1.
Proposition 2 There exists a global maximum to the monopolist’s problem.
Proof The objective function for the selling monopolist is
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+ (−x1) 1− e
−rt1
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, q, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
Note that ∀i ∈ N, g (xi, ti) and pc (g, q, αc) are bounded. So, for some
j ∈ N, pi (q0, x, t) → −∞ as xj → ∞. That is for some X, pi (q0, x, t) < 0,
∀xi > X. However, we established in Lemma 5 that pi (q0, x, t) > q0r . Hence,
xi’s must be chosen from [0, X]. Also, for some j ∈ N, as tj →∞, pi (q0, x, t) <
pi (q0, x, t) + pi (qj−1, xp, tp) = pi′ where pi (qj−1, xp, tp) is the profit generated
by a constant stream {xp, tp} after the introduction of the product of quality
qj−1. However, we have proved that pi (qj−1, xp, tp) >
qj−1
r
. This implies for
some T , pi (q0, x, t) < pi
′,∀ti > T . So, ti’s must be chosen from [0, T ]. Hence,
the maximum must be within the compact domain [0, X]× [0, T ] .
Since g and pc are continuous, pi is continuous. pi is continuous within the
compact domain [0, X]× [0, T ]. So, it has a maximum. By Lemma 5, we have
an interior solution. 
Let pi∗ denote a solution to (SP ) in equation 5.1. We now establish the
functional equation for the monopolist’s problem as we did in Chapter 4,
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(FE) Π (q) = max
x,t
{
−1
r
x+ e−rt
(
− (F + c) + x
r
+ p (q, x, t) + Π (q′)
)}
(5.6)
where p (q, x, t) = (g + pc (g, q, αc))
1−e−rte
r
.
We again show that the sequential problem in equation 5.1 and functional
equation in 5.6 are equivalent.
Lemma 7 pi∗ solves (FE) .
Proof Again, let Q represents the set of possible values for the state variable,
q and > : Q → Q be the correspondence s.t for each q ∈ Q, > (q) is the
set of the feasible values for the quality of the product next period. Let
A = {(qi, qi+1) ∈ Q×Q : qi+1 ∈ > (qi)} be the graph of >, and H : A → R
be the per period return function. The objective function in equation 5.1 can
also be written as follows:
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1e−rti [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, qi−1, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1
[
−e−rti (F + c)− xi1− e
−rti
r
]
(5.7)
Then, we have following form for the sequential problem:
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
βiHi where
βi = e
−rTi−1 and
Hi = e
−rti [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, qi−1, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
−e−rti (F + c)− xi1− e
−rti
r
As it is stated before, Q is a convex subset of R , and the correspondence
> : Q→ Q is nonempty, compact-valued and continuous. Moreover, for each
i ∈ N, 0 < ti < ∞ implies that 0 < βi < 1. Now, g and pc are bounded and
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∀i ∈ N, (xi, ti) ∈ [0, X] × [0, T ]. Hence, Hi is bounded for each i ∈ N. Since
g and pc are continuous, Hi is continuous. With conditions above satisfied,
solutions to (FE) coincide exactly to solutions of (SP ) (Stokey, 1989). 
We can now continue our analysis with solving functional equation. At
first, we go through with the differentiability of the functional equation in
order to compare the market equilibrium with the social optimum.
Lemma 8 Π is continuously differentiable at q. Moreover, the greatest lower
bound for Πq (q) is less than
1
r
.
Proof The proof of differentiability is similar to the one in Chapter 4. By
Assumption 3, H is strictly concave (see the appendix). Since g and pc are
continuously differentiable, so is H. Moreover, it can be easily shown that >
is convex. With these conditions satisfied, Π is continuously differentiable at
q (Stokey, 1989).
Πq (q) = Πq1 (q1) = e
−rt1 (pq1 (q, x, t) + Πq2 (q2))
=
∞∑
i=1
e
−r
(
i∑
j=0
tj
)
pqi (q, x, t) where t0 = 0. (5.8)
Since p (q, x, t) = (g + pc (g, q, αc))
1−e−rte
r
and pc (g, q, αc) = q,
pqi (q, x, t) =
1−e−rtei
r
for each i ∈ N. If Πq (q) = K where K is the great-
est lower bound, K is achieved by constant stream of ti’s. Hence,
K =
∞∑
i=1
e
−r
(
i∑
j=0
t
)
1− e−rte
r
=
1− e−rte
(ert − 1) r
Since 0 < t <∞, K < 1
r
.
Thus, the greatest lower bound for Πq (q) is less than Vq (q) . 
We have showed that when the quality of a product increases, the social
planner benefits more than the monopolist. The reason is that in order to get
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the social value of an innovation as the social planner does, the monopolist
charges the flow utility of the current product for the price of the compo-
nent. However, while an increase in the quality of a product affects the social
planner in the current period, the monopolist realizes this change in the next
period when consumers have to replace the component. Therefore, the mo-
nopolist waits longer than the social planner does in order to capture the
gains from quality change.
Π satisfies the following first order conditions:
Πx = −(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂x
+ e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂q
gx + e
−rt∂Π(q
′)
∂q′
gx (5.9)
Πt = −re−rt
(
− (F + c) + x
r
+ p (q, x, t) + Π (q′)
)
+ e−rt
(
∂p (q, x, t)
∂t
+
∂p (q, x, t)
∂q
gt +
∂Π(q′)
∂q′
gt
)
(5.10)
Here, we will assume that ∂p(q,x,t)
∂x
= 0 and ∂p(q,x,t)
∂t
= 0. This is reasonable
since the optimum price the monopolist charges for the primary product is
q′ 1−e
−rte
r
. Hence, R&D inputs x and t affect the price of the new generation
through their effects on quality. If we substitute pq (q, x, t) =
1−e−rte
r
, Πq (q) =
1−e−rte
(ert−1)r and t
e = t in equations 5.9 and 5.10, we obtain
−(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
1
r
gx = 0 (5.11)
r (F + c)− x− rp (q, x, t)− rΠ(q′) + 1
r
gt = 0 (5.12)
Note that equation 4.10 is same as equation 5.11. We can not know exact
forms of functional equations, V and Π so that we can not say equations
4.11 and 5.12 are also equal. However, we expect their equivalence since the
32
monopolist’s problem is same as the social planner’s when pc (q, x, t) = q
and te = t. By setting pc = q, the monopolist gets the social value of the
innovation. Thus, the monopolist chooses the level of R&D investment and
the gestation periods at social optimum. It is somewhat different than Fish-
man&Rob’s result. They find that the monopoly implements the socially
optimal rate of innovation by designing old models to expire just as new ones
are introduced (Fishman, Rob, 2000). However, we find that the monopo-
list can achieve the socially optimal rate of innovation by partial physical
obsolescence if it has full monopoly power in the component market.
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CHAPTER 6
THE EQUILIBRIUM WHEN THE
COMPONENT MARKET IS PERFECTLY
COMPETITIVE
We now consider the case where replacement components are supplied by
competitive firms. This means that pc = αc, and that p = (q
′ − q) + αc.
Since every consumer will always buy the latest generation, this implies that
p = g+αc. Given this, we can write the sequential problem for the monopolist
as follows:
(SP ) sup
{xi,ti}∞i=1
pi (q0, x, t)
where
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+ (−x1) 1− e
−rt1
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi (g (xi, ti) + αc)
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
(6.1)
We first establish that this payoff function is bounded, and that new genera-
tions are introduced.
Lemma 9 For any given path {xi, ti}∞i=1, pi (q0, x, t) < ∞. Furthermore, if
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{xi, ti}∞i=1 is an optimal path, then q0r < pi (q0, x, t) and ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞.
Proof Suppose that for a given path {xi, ti}, pi (q0, x, t) =∞.
pi is infinite only if for infinitely many periods e−rTi is nearly 1. Since
e−rTi = e−r(Ti−1+ti), that is equivalent to e−rTI → 1 as I → ∞. TI → 0 iff
∀i ∈ N, ti → 0. This implies ∀i ∈ N, g (xi, ti) → 0. We assume rational
expectations, so ∀i ∈ N, tei → 0. Hence, we obtain
lim
TI→0
I∑
i=1
e−rTi
[
− (F + c) + (g (xi, ti) + αc) 1− e
−rtei
r
− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
→ − I (F + c)
Above equation implies that as I → ∞, pi (q0, x, t) → −∞. However, we
assumed that pi (q0, x, t) =∞. This is a contradiction.
Now, suppose that {x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ) in equation 6.1. Let p¯i be the value
of the constant stream, which is ∀i ∈ N, {xi, ti} = {xp, tp}. Hence,
p¯i (q0, xp, tp) =
q0 − xp
r
+
[g (xp, tp) + αc]
(
1− e−rte)
r (ertp − 1) −
(F + c)
ertp − 1
By Assumption 3, p¯i (q0, xp, tp) >
q0
r
. Since {x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ), the value
generated by the stream {x∗i , t∗i } must be at least equal to any other stream.
That is pi∗ (q0, x∗, t∗) ≥ p¯i (q0, xp, tp) > q0r .
In order to prove the final step, suppose that there exists an optimal path
{xi, ti} such that for some period k, tk = ∞. The value of the stream after
the introduction of the product of quality qk−1,
pi (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1− e
−rtk
r
+
∞∑
i=k
e−rTi (g (xi, ti) + αc)
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=k
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
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Again, the second line in the above expression is zero. Hence,
pi (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1
r
.
≤ qk−1
r
.
However, we proved that pi (qk−1, x, t) >
qk−1
r
. Thus, ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞. 
Our next result states that the monopolist invests in R&D in every gesta-
tion period eventhough the components are supplied by competitive firms.
Lemma 10 If there exists a solution to (SP ) in equation 6.1, then ∀i ∈ N,
ti <∞ =⇒ xi > 0 for the optimal path.
Proof Suppose that there exists an optimal path {xi, ti} s.t. ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞,
but ∃ s ∈ N s.t. xs = 0. The value generated by this stream after the
introduction of the product at time s− 1 :
pi (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + 1− e
−rtes−1
r
[g (xs−1, ts−1) + αc] + e−rtspi (qs, x, t)
Take an another stream s.t. ∀i/s ∈ N, x′i = xi, t′i = ti and for period s,
x′s = 0, t
′
s = 0. The value of this path at time s− 1 :
pi
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
= − (F + c)+1− e
−rt′es−1
r
[
g
(
x′s−1, t
′
s−1
)
+ αc
]
+e−rt
′
spi (q′s, x
′, t′)
Again, we substitute tes−1 = ts in above equations. So, t
′
s = 0 implies
1− e−rt′s
r
[
g
(
x′s−1, t
′
s−1
)
+ αc
] 1− e−rt′s
r
= 0.
Note that qs−1 =
s−1∑
i=1
g (xi, ti) =
s−1∑
i=1
g (x′i, t
′
i) = q
′
s−1. Also we know that
g (xs, ts) = 0 when xs = 0. That is q
′
s = qs, which implies pi (qs, x, t) =
pi (q′s, x
′, t′) . Since {xi, ti} is optimal, pi (qs−1, x, t) ≥ pi
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
. It is sat-
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isfied when
1− e−rts
r
[g (xs−1, ts−1) + αc] +
(
e−rts − 1) pi (qs, x, t) ≥ 0
That is either
ts = 0
or (
pi (qs, x, t)− [g (xs−1, ts−1) + αc]
r
)
≤ 0. (6.2)
By Lemma 9 above, pi (qs, x, t) >
qs
r
. Moreover, qs = qs−2 + g (xs−1, ts−1) +
g (xs, ts) where g (xs, ts) = 0. If we substitute this into equation 6.2, we obtain:
αc
r
>
qs−2
r
However, by Assumption 3, pc (g, q, αc) ≤ q, in case αc ≤ qs−2. Hence, ts = 0.
pi (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + e−rtspi (qs, x, t)
< pi (qs, x, t)
Since g (xs, ts) = 0 , pi (qs−1, x, t) = pi (qs, x, t). Thus we have a contradiction.
If {xi, ti} is an optimal path and ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞, then ∀i ∈ N, xi > 0. 
Given the above we can now show there is a solution to the monopolist’s
problem when there is perfect competition in the component market.
Proposition 3 There exists a global maximum to the monopolist’s problem.
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Proof The profit function for the selling monopolist is
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+ (−x1) 1− e
−rt1
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi (g (xi, ti) + αc)
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
Note that ∀i ∈ N, g (xi, ti) is bounded. So, for some j ∈ N, pi (q0, x, t) →
−∞ as xj → ∞. That is for some X, pi (q0, x, t) < 0, ∀xi > X. However,
we established in Lemma 9 that pi (q0, x, t) >
q0
r
. Hence, xi’s must be chosen
from [0, X] . Also, for some j ∈ N, as tj → ∞, pi (q0, x, t) < pi (q0, x, t) +
pi (qj−1, xp, tp) = pi′ where pi (qj−1, xp, tp) is the profit generated by a constant
stream {xp, tp} after the introduction of the product of quality qj−1. However,
we know that pi (qj−1, xp, tp) >
qj−1
r
. This implies for some T, pi (q0, x, t) < pi
′,
∀ti > T. So, ti’s must be chosen from [0, T ] . Hence, the maximum must be
within the compact domain [0, X]× [0, T ] .
Since g is continuous, pi is continuous. pi is continuous within the compact
domain [0, X] × [0, T ]. So, it has a maximum. By Lemma 10, we have an
interior solution. 
Let pi∗C be a solution to the sequential problem when the component mar-
ket is perfectly competitive. We establish again the corresponding functional
equation,
(FE) Π (q) = max
x,t
{
−1
r
x+ e−rt
(
− (F + c) + x
r
+ p (q, x, t) + Π (q′)
)}
(6.3)
where p (q, x, t) = (g + αc) 1−e
−rte
r
.
As we did before, we will show now the sequential problem and the func-
tional equation have the same solutions.
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Lemma 11 pi∗C solves (FE) in equation 6.3.
Proof Q, A, H, > are defined as before. The objective function in equation
6.1 can also be written as follows:
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1e−rti (g (xi, ti) + αc)
(1− e−rti+1)
r
(6.4)
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi−1
[
−e−rti (F + c)− xi1− e
−rti
r
]
(6.5)
Then, we have following form for the sequential problem in equation 6.4:
pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+
∞∑
i=1
βiHi where
βi = e
−rTi−1 and
Hi = −xi1− e
−rti
r
+ e−rti
(
(g (xi, ti) + αc)
(1− e−rti+1)
r
− (F + c)
)
Again, since > (qi) = qi + g (xi+1, ti+1) = qi+1 for each i ∈ N, Q is a convex
subset of R, and the correspondence > : Q→ Q is nonempty, compact-valued
and continuous. For each i ∈ N, 0 < βi < 1. Also, g is bounded and ∀i ∈ N,
(xi, ti) ∈ [0, X] × [0, T ]. Hence, Hi is bounded for each i ∈ N. Since g is
continuous, Hi is continuous. With conditions above satisfied, solutions to
(FE) coincide exactly to solutions of (SP ) (Stokey, 1989). 
We can now continue our analysis with functional equation. In order to
analyze how R&D incentives are affected when the market structure in the
component market changes, we should look at the first order conditions.
Lemma 12 Π is continuously differentiable at q. Moreover, Πq (q) is zero.
Proof The proof of differentiability is similar to the one in Chapter 5. By
Assumption 3, H is strictly concave (see the appendix). Since g and pc are
continuously differentiable, so is H. As we stated before, > is convex. Hence,
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Π is continuously differentiable at q (Stokey, 1989).
Πq (q) = Πq1 (q1) = e
−rt1 (pq1 (q, x, t) + Πq2 (q2))
=
∞∑
i=1
e
−r
(
i∑
j=0
tj
)
pqi (q, x, t) where t0 = 0.
However, since p (q, x, t) = (g + αc) 1−e
−rte
r
, pqi (q, x, t) = 0 for each i ∈ N.
That is Πq (q) = 0. 
Above lemma states that when the component market is perfectly com-
petitive, the quality of a product does not affect monopolist’s profits. This
is different than what we find in the case where the monopolist controls the
component market. Since there is now competition in the component mar-
ket, the monopolist can not charge the flow utility of the current product for
the price of the component. Therefore, the price of the new generation is
now determined by three factors; g− quality increment between two consecu-
tive products, te− consumers’ expectations and αc− the marginal cost of the
component.
Π satisfies the following first order conditions:
Πx = −(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂x
+e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂q
gx + e
−rt∂Π(q
′)
∂q′
gx (6.6)
Πt = −re−rt
(
− (F + c) + x
r
+ p (q, x, t) + Π (q′)
)
+e−rt
(
∂p (q, x, t)
∂t
+
∂p (q, x, t)
∂q
gt +
∂Π(q′)
∂q′
gt
)
(6.7)
If we substitute pq (q, x, t) = 0 and Πq (q) = 0 into equations 6.6 and 6.7,
we obtain
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−(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
1− e−rt
r
gx = 0 (6.8)
r (F + c)− x− rp (q, x, t)− rΠ(q′) + 1− e
−rt
r
gt = 0 (6.9)
First order conditions for the monopoly are different when there is perfect
competition in the component market. There is an extra term (1− e−rt) mul-
tiplied by e−rt gx
r
and gt
r
. This implies marginal productivities of R&D inputs
are less effective on monopoly profits if the environment in the component
market becomes competitive. The reason is as follows: R&D inputs affect
the prices of the later generations in two ways. The direct effect is that R&D
investments determine the level of the quality increment, g, thereby affecting
immediately the price of the next generation. The indirect effect is that since
knowledge builds up cumulatively, they determine the quality of the next
product, which affects the price of the component in later generations. When
the monopolist controls the component market, these two effects are active.
However, if the component market is perfectly competitive, the indirect effect
is eliminated as the price of the component is always set up at its marginal
cost.
We are not able to analyze the optimal choices of x and t just solving
these first order conditions. However, in the next chapter we will also be
able to determine how gestation periods and R&D investments change if the
competition arises in the component market.
Our analysis in this chapter coincide with Fishman and Rob’s monopoly
analysis for slightly different costs. They find the monopolist innovates less
frequently and invests less in R&D than the social planner. In the next chap-
ter, we are going to show that the market structure of the component market
changes these results even the monopolist can engage in partial physical ob-
solescence.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EQUILIBRIUM WHEN THE
COMPONENT MARKET IS
IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE
We now consider the case where the component market is imperfectly com-
petitive. In Chapter 5, we find that if the monopolist has full market power
in the component market, the optimal price for the component good is the
quality of the current product in flow terms. In Chapter 6, if the component
market is perfectly competitive, the price of the component good is set up at
its marginal cost, αc. Accordingly, we assume that if the component market
is imperfectly competitive, the price of the component lies between these two
values. Since there is now competition in the component good market, the
monopolist can not charge q for the component good and also we rule out the
case where pc ≤ αc, thereby preventing firms making loss in the component
market. Therefore, pc ∈ (αc, q) and the corresponding sequential problem for
the monopolist is
(SP ) sup
{xi,ti}∞i=1
pi (q0, x, t) s.t.
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pi (q0, x, t) =
q0
r
+ (−x1) 1− e
−rt1
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi [g (xi, ti) + pc (g, qi, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=1
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
(7.1)
Note that when for each i ∈ N, pc (g, qi, αc) = qi, we have the same
problem when the monopolist controls the component market. When for
each i ∈ N, pc (g, qi, αc) = αc, we ended up with the monopolist’s problem in
Chapter 6, where the monopolist faces perfect competition in the component
market.
We are going to follow the same steps as we did in previous chapters.
Lemma 13 For any given path {xi, ti}∞i=1, pi (q0, x, t) < ∞. Furthermore, if
{xi, ti}∞i=1 is an optimal path, then q0r < pi (q0, x, t) and ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞.
Proof Since for each i ∈ N, pc (g, qi, αc) < qi, for any path {xi, ti}∞i=1
pi (q0, x, t) < W (q0, x, t) .
We proved in Lemma 1 that for any given path {xi, ti}∞i=1, W (q0, x, t) <
∞. Hence, pi (q0, x, t) <∞.
Now, suppose that {x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ) . Let piIMp be the value of the con-
stant stream in imperfect component market, which is ∀i ∈ N, {xi, ti} =
{xp, tp}. Hence,
piIMp =
q0 − xp
r
+
g (xp, tp)
(
1− e−rte)
r (ertp − 1)
+
∞∑
i=1
e−ritp
(
1− e−rte) pc (qi, αc)
r
− (F + c)
ertp − 1
Now, for each i ∈ N, αc ≤ pc (g, qi, αc). Thus, piCp ≤ piIMp , where piCp be
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the value of the constant stream in perfectly competitive component market.
By Lemma 9, piIMp >
q0
r
. Since {x∗i , t∗i } solves (SP ) , the value generated
by the stream {x∗i , t∗i } must be at least equal to any other stream. That is
pi∗ (q0, x∗, t∗) ≥ piIMp > q0r .
In order to prove the final step, suppose that there exists an optimal path
{xi, ti} such that for some period k, tk = ∞. The value of the stream after
the introduction of the product of quality qk−1,
pi (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1− e
−rtk
r
+
∞∑
i=k
e−rTi [g (xi, ti) + pc (qi, αc)]
1− e−rtei
r
+
∞∑
i=k
e−rTi
[
− (F + c)− xi+11− e
−rti+1
r
]
As before, second line in the above expression is zero. Hence,
pi (qk−1, x, t) =
qk−1
r
+ (−xk) 1
r
.
≤ qk−1
r
.
However, we know that pi (qk−1, x, t) >
qk−1
r
. Thus, ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞. 
Until now we have established that independent of the market structure
of the component market, R&D investments are positive. We will show that
this result holds even the component market is imperfectly competitive.
Lemma 14 If there exists a solution to (SP ) , then ∀i ∈ N, ti <∞ =⇒ xi >
0 for the optimal path.
Proof Again, suppose that there exists an optimal path {xi, ti} s.t. ∀i ∈ N,
ti <∞, but ∃ s ∈ N s.t. xs = 0. The value generated by this stream after the
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introduction of the product at generation s− 1 :
pi (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + 1− e
−rtes−1
r
[g (xs−1, ts−1) + pc (g, q, αc)]
+e−rtspi (qs, x, t)
Take an another stream s.t. ∀i/s ∈ N, x′i = xi, t′i = ti and for period s,
x′s = 0, t
′
s = 0. The value of this path at time s− 1 :
pi
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
= − (F + c) + 1− e
−rte′s−1
r
[
g
(
x′s−1, t
′
s−1
)
+ pc (g, q
′, αc)
]
+e−rt
′
spi (q′s, x
′, t′)
Substituting tes−1 = ts and t
′
s = 0, we obtain
1− e−rt′s
r
[
g
(
x′s−1, t
′
s−1
)
+ pc (g, q
′, αc)
]
= 0.
Again, q′s = qs implies pi (qs, x, t) = pi (q
′
s, x
′, t′). Since {xi, ti} is optimal,
pi (qs−1, x, t) ≥ pi
(
q′s−1, x
′, t′
)
. It is satisfied when
1− e−rts
r
[g (xs−1, ts−1) + pc (g, q, αc)] +
(
e−rts − 1) pi (qs, x, t) ≥ 0
That is either
ts = 0
or
pi (qs, x, t) ≤ g (xs−1, ts−1) + pc (g, q, αc)
r
. (7.2)
We know that at time s − 1, pc (g, q, αc) < qs−2. Equation 7.2 is satisfied
when
pi (qs, x, t) <
qs
r
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However, by Lemma 13 above, pi (qs, x, t) >
qs
r
. Thus, ts = 0 and
pi (qs−1, x, t) = − (F + c) + e−rtspi (qs, x, t)
< pi (qs, x, t)
Since g (xs, ts) = 0, pi (qs−1, x, t) = pi (qs, x, t). Thus, we have a contradiction.

Proposition 4 There exists a global maximum to the monopolist’s problem.
Proof See the proof of Proposition 2. 
Let pi∗IM be a solution to (SP ) . We now establish the functional equation
for the monopolist’s problem as we did in previous chapters,
(FE) Π (q) = max
x,t
{
−1
r
x+ e−rt
(
− (F + c) + x
r
+ p (q, x, t) + Π (q′)
)}
(7.3)
where p (q, x, t) = (g + pc (g, q, αc))
1−e−rte
r
.
Lemma 15 pi∗IM solves (FE) in equation 7.3.
Proof See the corresponding lemma when the monopolist controls the com-
ponent market. 
In order to prove our main proposition, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 16 Π is continuously differentiable at q.
Proof Similar to the corresponding lemma in Chapter 5. Note that
Πq (q) = Πq1 (q1) = e
−rt1 (pq1 (q, x, t) + Πq2 (q2))
=
∞∑
i=1
e
−r
(
i∑
j=0
tj
)
pqi (q, x, t) where t0 = 0.
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Since p (q, x, t) = (g + pc (g, q, αc))
1−e−rte
r
, pqi (q, x, t) = pcq (g, q, αc)
1−e−rtei
r
for each i ∈ N. Hence,
Πq (q) =
∞∑
i=1
e
−r
(
i∑
j=0
tj
)
pcq (g, q, αc)
1− e−rtei
r
(7.4)

Π satisfies the following first order conditions:
Πx = −(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂x
+e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂q
gx + e
−rt∂Π(q
′)
∂q′
gx (7.5)
Πt = −re−rt
(
− (F + c) + x
r
+ p (q, x, t) + Π (q′)
)
+e−rt
(
∂p (q, x, t)
∂t
+
∂p (q, x, t)
∂q
gt +
∂Π(q′)
∂q′
gt
)
(7.6)
Now, we are going to analyze the direction of changes in R&D decisions
when the price of the component good increases. In this way, we will be able
to figure out how the market structure of the component market affects the
innovation activity.
Proposition 5 If the price of the component increases, the selling monopolist
innovates more frequently and invests more in R&D.
Proof We know from first order conditions in equations 7.5 and 7.6,
Πt (q) = 0
Πx (q) = 0
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If we take derivatives with respect to p,
Πtt (q)
∂t
∂p
+Πtx (q)
∂x
∂p
+Πtp = 0
Πxt (q)
∂t
∂p
+Πxx (q)
∂x
∂p
+Πxp = 0
In matrix form, we have
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∂t∗
∂p
∂x∗
∂p
= − Πtp
Πxp
If we take derivative of (FE) in equation 7.3 with respect to p, Πp = e
−rt.
Hence,
Πtp
Πxp
=
−re−rt
0
Now we apply Cramer’s Rule.
∂x∗
∂p
=
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt re
−rt
Πxt 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−re−rtΠxt
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂t∗
∂p
=
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
re−rt Πtx
0 Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
re−rtΠxx
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
We know that the denominators are positive by concavity. In order to
establish how the price of the component affects R&D decisions, we need to
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figure out the signs of Πxt and Πxx. Since
Πx = −(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂x
+ e−rt
∂p (q, x, t)
∂q
gx + e
−rt∂Π(q
′)
∂q′
gx
= −(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
1− e−rte
r
gx
+e−rt
1− e−rte
r
∂pc (g, q, αc)
∂q
gx + e
−rt∂Π(q
′)
∂q′
gx
Πxx = e
−rt
 1−e−rter gxx + 1−e−rter pcq (g, q, αc) gxx + 1−e−rter pcqq (g, q, αc) (gx)2
+ Πq′ (q
′) gxx +Πq′q′ (q′) (gx)
2

Under Assumptions 3 and 3, we have pcq (g, q, αc) > 0, pcqq (g, q, αc) ≤ 0
and gxx ≤ 0. Moreover, equation 7.4 implies Πq′q′ (q′) ≤ 0 and Πq′ (q′) > 0.
Thus, Πxx < 0.
Πxt = −e−rtr
(
1
r
+
1− e−rte
r
gx +
1− e−rte
r
pcq (g, q, αc) gx +Πq′ (q
′) gx
)
+e−rt
 1−e−rter gxt + 1−e−rter pcq (g, q, αc) gxt
+1−e
−rte
r
pcqq (g, q, αc) gxgt

+e−rt (Πq′ (q′) gxt +Πq′q′ (q′) gxgt)
If we rearrange the terms, we have
Πxt = e
−rt

−1 + 1−e−rte
r
(gxt − rgx) + 1−e−rt
e
r
pcq (g, q, αc) (gxt − rgx)
+Πq′ (q
′) (gxt − rgx)
+ 1−e
−rte
r
pcqq (g, q, αc) gxgt +Πq′q′ (q
′) gxgt

If x and t are substitutes- gxt < 0 for all (x, t)−or if x and t are comple-
ments but not strong complements- 0 < gxt < rgx, the term in parenthesis
would be negative. As Fishman and Rob (2000) state some conventional
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productions functions, such as Cobb-Douglas or the constant elasticity of
substitution satisfy this condition. Hence, we assume this restriction on g
holds.
Thus, Πxt < 0.
Therefore,
∂x∗
∂p
1− e−rte
r
=
∂x∗
∂pc
> 0 (7.7)
and
∂t∗
∂p
1− e−rte
r
=
∂t∗
∂pc
< 0 (7.8)

From Proposition 5, one can easily show the following results.
Corollary 1 The monopolist innovates less frequently and invests less in
R&D than the efficient level unless he controls the component market.
Corollary 2 Competition in the component good market causes efficiency
loss in terms of R&D investments.
The results state that if the price of the component is higher, the mo-
nopolist innovates more frequently and invests more in R&D. The reason is
that consumers are willingly to pay for the incremental quality improvement
when a new generation is introduced. This implies the monopolist receives
less than the social value of an innovation. However, if the monopolist is able
to determine the durability of the component, he receives the social value
of an innovation by increasing the price of the component, which consumers
have to replace. It can charge as high as possible for the price of the compo-
nent when he controls the component market. On the other hand, when the
component market is imperfectly competitive, he is not able to compensate
his loss by changing the price of the component, thus he waits longer between
two product introductions. Thereby, consumers pay for the present model
in a longer period, which leads innovations to be delayed.
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Different than Fishman and Rob (2000), our results depend on the market
structure of the component market. We find that the monopolist innovates
less frequently and invests less in R&D than the efficient level unless he con-
trols the component market. Incorporating the component durability enables
us to conclude that competition in the component market causes departures
form socially optimal level of R&D investments. Therefore, a monopolist in
a primary market should also have market power in its component market.
We examine now how current R&D decisions change when the price of
the component good increases in the future.
Proposition 6 If the price of the component increases in the future, the
monopolist innovates less frequently and invests less in R&D today.
Proof Assume that at time s − 1, the monopolist has to decide its R&D
inputs, xs and ts. Let the price of the component be pck after k generations.
Πts (q) = 0
Πxs (q) = 0
If we take derivatives with respect to pk,
Πtt (q)
∂ts
∂pk
+Πtx (q)
∂xs
∂pk
+Πtpk = 0
Πxt (q)
∂ts
∂pk
+Πxx (q)
∂xs
∂pk
+Πxpk = 0
In matrix form, we have
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∂ts
∂pk
∂xs
∂pk
= − Πtpk
Πxpk
Now, if we take derivative of Π with respect to pk at time s−1, we obtain
Πpk = Π
k
i=se
−rti
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Hence,
Πtpk
Πxpk
=
−rΠki=se−rti
0
Again we apply Cramer’s Rule.
∂xs
∂pk
=
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt −rΠki=se−rti
Πxt 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
rΠki=se
−rtiΠxt
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂ts
∂pk
=
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−rΠki=se−rti Πtx
0 Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
−rΠki=se−rtiΠxx
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Πtt Πtx
Πxt Πxx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
We have Πxt < 0 and Πxx < 0. Therefore,
∂xs
∂pk
1− e−rte
r
=
∂xs
∂pck
< 0 (7.9)
and
∂ts
∂pk
1− e−rte
r
=
∂ts
∂pck
> 0

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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Early work in durable goods theory has always suggested that planned obso-
lescence is an incentive to reduce the durability of the whole of the product.
However, usually it is a component that becomes physically obsolete rather
than the whole unit.
In this paper, we analyze the R&D investments and the frequency of prod-
uct innovations of a durable good monopoly under the assumption that the
monopolist determines the durability of the component. We study the ef-
fects of the market structure in the component market on R&D decisions of
a durable good monopolist. We extend Fishman and Rob’s analysis by incor-
porating partial physical obsolescence to the model. The main assumptions
of the model are; innovations are recurrent, the knowledge builds up cumula-
tively, consumers are homogenous and the monopolist sells rather than rent
its products. We showed that under these circumstances if the monopolist
has market power in the component market, he innovates at the socially op-
timal pace. However, if the component market is perfectly competitive, the
monopolist innovates less frequently and invests less than the efficient level.
Our results in the case of perfectly competitive component market is similar
to Fishman and Rob’s.
We should note that the price structure different than the one in our
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analysis may change the results. However, incorporating more complex price
structure to the model will complicate the analysis. In addition, allowing
the monopolist to rent its products or relaxing the consumer homogeneity
assumption may strengthen or weaken our results. The analysis of these
issues is going to be the topic of future research.
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APPENDIX
Proof [Proof of Lemma 5] In order to prove V is differentiable, we need to
prove first per period return function H is strictly concave. So, we are going
to show D2H (x, t) is a negative definite matrix.
D2H (x, t) =
Hxx Hxt
Htx Htt
D2H (x, t) is negative definite if and only if Hxx < 0 and HxxHtt− HxtHtx >
0. Now, we will derive second order derivatives.
H = −x(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
(
g (x, t)
r
− (F + c)
)
Hx = −(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
gx
r
= 0
Hxx = e
−rt gxx
r
We assume that g is strictly concave. Hence, Hxx < 0.
Ht = −xe−rt − re−rt
(
g (x, t)
r
− (F + c)
)
+ e−rt
gt
r
= 0
Htt = rxe
−rt + r2e−rt
(
g (x, t)
r
− (F + c)
)
− re−rt gt
r
−re−rt gt
r
+ e−rt
gtt
r
Htx = −e−rt − e−rtgx + e−rt gtx
r
Similarly,
Hxt = −e−rt − e−rtgx + e−rt gxt
r
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We assume that gxt = gtx. This implies Hxt = Htx. We want to have dif-
ferentiability around the optimal solution so that we substitute first order
conditions into the second order conditions. This yields:
HxxHtt −H2xt = e−rt
gxx
r
(
−re−rt gt
r
+ e−rt
gtt
r
)
−
(
−1 + e−rt gxt
r
)2
= −e−2rt gxx
r
gt + e
−2rt gxx
r
gtt
r
−
(
−1 + e−rt gxt
r
)2
By Assumption 3, we have gxxgtt ≥ (gxt − rert)2 . If we multiply both side
with e
−2rt
r2
, we obtain
e−2rt
gxx
r
gtt
r
≥
(
e−rt
gxt
r
− 1
)2
Since g is increasing in t, −e−2rt gxx
r
gt > 0. Thus, HxxHtt −H2xt > 0. So, H is
strictly concave and V is differentiable. 
Proof [Proof of Lemma 10] Again, we need to prove per period return func-
tion H is strictly concave.
D2H (x, t) =
Hxx Hxt
Htx Htt
D2H (x, t) is negative definite if and only if Hxx < 0 and HxxHtt− HxtHtx >
0. We derive second order conditions.
H = −x(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
((
1− e−rte) g (x, t) + q
r
− (F + c)
)
Hx = −(1− e
−rt)
r
+ e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gx
r
= 0
Hxx = e
−rt (1− e−rte) gxx
r
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Since g is strictly concave, Hxx < 0.
Ht = 0 = −xe−rt − re−rt
((
1− e−rte) g (x, t) + q
r
− (F + c)
)
+e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gt
r
Htt = −rHt +−re−rt
(
1− e−rte) gt
r
+ e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gtt
r
Htx = −e−rt − e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gx + e−rt (1− e−rte) gtx
r
Similarly,
Hxt = −e−rt − e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gx + e−rt (1− e−rte) gxt
r
We assume that gxt = gtx. This implies Hxt = Htx. We again substitute first
order conditions into the second order conditions. This yields:
HxxHtt −H2xt = e−2rt
(
1− e−rte)2 gxx
r
(
−gt + gtt
r
)
−
(
e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gxt
r
− 1
)2
= −e−2rt (1− e−rte)2 gxx
r
gt + e
−2rt (1− e−rte)2 gxx
r
gtt
r
−
(
e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gxt
r
− 1
)2
By Assumption 3, we have
(
1− e−rte)2 gxxgtt ≥ ((1− e−rte) gxt − rert)2 . If
we multiply both side with e
−2rt
r2
, we get
e−2rt
(
1− e−rte)2 gxx
r
gtt
r
≥
(
e−rt
(
1− e−rte) gxt
r
− 1
)2
Thus, HxxHtt −H2xt > 0. H is strictly concave and Π is differentiable. 
Proof [Proof of Lemma 17] The proof is similar to the one above. The only
difference is in the formation of per period function H, q is replaced with αc.

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